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1. Introduction  
 
The macro development literature provides many important insights into the process of 
economic development, understood as growth in GDP per capita, and it points to political 
and legal institutions, human capital and natural resource endowments as some of the 
fundamental causal factors. While sustained growth in GDP per capita without doubt is 
important, it is recognized widely that economic growth needs not go hand in hand with 
sustainable development understood as expansion in the stocks of wealth required to 
sustain high levels of human wellbeing (Arrow et al. 2003). Understanding the 
determinants of sustainable development, as a consequence, becomes a top priority to 
move the macro development literature forward and we argue that a public choice 
perspective can offer new insights. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to study the 
effect of government ideology on sustainable development and to ask whether 
governmental turnover creates partisan cycles as well as to explore whether elections 
themselves induce opportunistic political cycles in genuine investment.  
The value of doing that is two-fold. First, in the face of important social 
challenges, ranging from climate change to aging populations, the question of sustainable 
development has become a top priority for many observers and policy-makers (Arrow et 
al., 2004). Sustainability is closely related to investment in a society’s capital stocks 
broadly conceived to include manufactured, human and natural capital1, referred to as 
genuine wealth. A country that is running down its genuine wealth is on an unsustainable 
development path and will experience falling welfare levels even if in the short-term its 
GDP per capita is rising. More precisely, the intertemporal social welfare of a society is 
increasing if and only if net investment in its genuine wealth is positive (Dasgupta and 
                                                          
1 Natural capital refers to physical stocks of renewable and non-renewable resources and to the physical 
receptor systems that can assimilate pollution (e.g., the seas and the atmosphere).  
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Mäler 2000; Arrow et al. 2003). Since these genuine investments can, in principle, be 
measured (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; World Bank 2006), it is possible to study 
empirically the determinants of sustainable development and doing so is of first-order 
importance (Dasgupta 2010). 
Second, sustainability intrinsically is linked to issues of governance. As noted, 
sustainable development requires investment in society’s capital assets and decisions on 
these investments are the outcomes of a political process as well as market processes. 
Aspects of this nexus have been investigated previously. Aidt (2009, 2011), for example, 
shows that corruption has a robust negative effect on sustainable development, while legal 
institutions that govern the way disputes are settled make little difference. Venard (2013) 
investigates the impact of political institutions and corruption on sustainable development 
and shows, in a cross-country analysis, that institutional quality affects growth in genuine 
wealth both directly and indirectly by reducing corruption. We add to this literature by 
studying whether short-term fluctuations in government ideology (measured on a left-right 
scale) induce fluctuations in genuine investment. This is an important endeavor because it 
helps us understand what causes variations in these investments within a set of countries 
with basic democratic institutions (regular elections). It is also important because political 
polarization is on the rise in many countries and, thus, if government ideology plays a role 
in whether a country is on (or stays on) a sustainable path, that trend might magnify the 
effect of politics on sustainability. 
Specifically, we use a panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013 to study the 
relationship between government ideology and growth in genuine investment. We find 
that right-wing governments are associated with improvements in genuine investment 
while genuine wealth tends to deteriorate under left-wing governments. Our result is new 
to the literature and remarkably robust. 
4 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to 
the theory underlying the use of genuine investment as an index of sustainable 
development and develops hypotheses linking investment in genuine wealth to 
government ideology and the partisan cycle. Section 3 presents the data and the 
econometric approach. Section 4 reports the main results related to government ideology 
and genuine investment. Section 5 considers the issue of endogeneity. Section 6 
investigates the interplay between the time a party has been in power, government 
ideology and genuine investment. Section 7 offers a broader discussion of the results and 
concludes. The online supplementary material includes an appendix with tables reporting 
robustness checks and the Stata code and data to replicate the results in the main text. 
 2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
The World Commission (1997) loosely defines sustainable development as a current 
economic path that does not compromise the well-being of future generations. Arrow et al. 
(2004) propose a more precise definition, which we adopt for the purpose of our study.2 
Their starting point is an index of intertemporal social welfare of an economy at a given 
time t. Intertemporal social welfare, denoted by 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡, is a measure of the present discounted 
value of social welfare attained at each future date along a given development path. An 
economy is, then, said to be on a sustainable development path if and only if 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 is not 
declining over time along that path. Clearly, that definition puts the emphasis on the 
intertemporal aspect of the change in social welfare, not on its level, and on the stock of 
                                                          
2This, of course, not the only definition of sustainable development. In fact, many different definitions have 
been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., Lawn 2003). The advantage of the World Commission’s definition 
over alternatives is that it is firmly based on welfare economics considerations.  
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national wealth rather than on the flow of national income.3 Such a conception of 
sustainable development makes it clear why commonly used indicators of human well-
being, such as Gross National Product (GNP per capita), Net National Product (NNP per 
capita) or the Human Development Index (HDI), are unsatisfactory measures of 
sustainable development. First, the problem with GNP per capita, amongst others, is that it 
is a gross measure and thus does not take depreciation of capital assets into account. For 
that reason, it does not reflect what happens to a nation’s wealth and cannot, therefore, be 
used as an indicator of sustainable development. Second, NNP is net of depreciation in a 
nation’s physical capital stock and it may, with various environmentally friendly 
adjustments suggested in the literature on green national accounting, also include net 
investment in natural capital (see, e.g., Asheim 2000). That is a step in the right direction, 
but as pointed out many years ago by Hicks (1940), if a nation’s wealth is to increase, the 
social value of consumption must not exceed NNP. The implication is that it is possible 
for NNP to grow while, at the same time, a nation’s wealth is run down. Third, the United 
Nations Development Program promotes the HDI as an indicator of the quality of life. The 
index is constructed by measuring a nation’s average performance gap – the normalized 
difference between the nation’s performance on a given indicator and best practice.4 The 
key constituents of the HDI are life expectancy at birth, GNP per capita, expected years of 
schooling and adult literacy. As pointed out by Dasgupta (2001, pp. 80-82), the 
fundamental problem with the HDI as a measure of sustainable development, besides the 
fact that it inherits the unsatisfactory features of GNP per capita, is that life expectancy 
                                                          
3 One consequence of the intertemporal emphasis is that tradeoffs are allowed, in the sense that social 
welfare may be lower at some future date than it is today so long as the discounted present value is not 
declining. See Arrow et al. (2004, p. 150) for further discussion of the implications of this definition. 
4Formally, let xij be a particular indicator of “development” i in country j. Then the preformance gap for that 
indicator for that country is 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗��𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�; the HDI for country j is 1 − 1𝑀𝑀∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑖𝑖  where M is the 
number of indicators.  
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and years of schooling are measures of current, not intertemporal well-being. Only literacy 
reflects intertemporal concerns and so, at best, “one-fourth” of the index is about 
sustainable development.   
       
2.1 Sustainable development and genuine investment 
It is useful to develop a simple theoretical framework that, firstly, makes the logic 
underlying Arrow et al.’s (2004) conception of sustainable development clear and, 
secondly, allows us to examine more clearly how government ideology or the political 
business cycle (PBC) may influence the prospect of sustainable development. The 
framework builds on Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) and, in particular, Aidt (2011). We 
imagine a society populated by many identical individuals who live forever. Time (t) is 
continuous. For simplicity, we assume that the population size is fixed. The economy 
produces an all-purpose good (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) from labor (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡), manufactured capital (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡), and the flow 
of natural resources (𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡). The production technology is represented as: 
     (1)     𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡), 
where F increases in each of the three arguments and is continuously differentiable. The 
production function need not be concave. As a consequence, the results regarding 
sustainable development, government ideology, and political business cycles apply to a 
wide class of economies with externalities and other market and government failures. 
Manufactured capital evolves over time according to the following law of motion: 
     (2)      𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡)− 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾, 
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where 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is aggregate consumption, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾 is investment in manufactured capital, and no 
depreciation (capital consumption) is assumed. The natural resource base (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) evolves 
according to the following law of motion: 
     (3)      𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝑀𝑀(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)−𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆, 
where 𝑀𝑀(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) is the natural rate of regeneration of the resource and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 can be interpreted as 
the net investment in the resource base. For non-renewable resources, the regeneration rate 
is zero for all 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, while for renewable resources it is positive. Individuals derive utility 
from consumption and disutility from labor supply, which are represented by a concave 
utility function, 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡). Intertemporal social welfare at time t can, then, be defined by a 
utilitarian social welfare function: 
     (4)     𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = ∫ 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝜏𝜏,𝐿𝐿𝜏𝜏)∞𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏, 
where δ>0 is the (utility) discount rate. A development path 𝑃𝑃𝜏𝜏 starting at time τ is a 
projection into the future of all relevant economic quantities, i.e., 
𝑃𝑃𝜏𝜏 ≡ {𝐶𝐶𝜏𝜏,𝐿𝐿𝜏𝜏,𝑅𝑅𝜏𝜏,𝐾𝐾𝜏𝜏,𝑆𝑆𝜏𝜏}𝜏𝜏=𝑡𝑡∞ . 
The economy’s institutions and the policy choices made under those institutions 
govern which development path actually is chosen at any given point in time. We make a 
distinction between the institutions that in a persistent way define the framework under 
which private and public decisions are made and day-to-day policy making which will be 
affected by the ideology of the ruling government (and other temporary factors). 
Institutions are not presumed to be perfect. Economic institutions can be dysfunctional 
(distorted markets, unregulated monopolies, and so on) or not, rent seeking may be kept in 
check or not, and the legal system may be effective or not. For the purpose of our analysis, 
we do, however, assume that the underlying political institutions are democratic in the 
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limited sense that elections in which the incumbent may lose power take place at regular 
intervals. We also assume that institutions are persistent.5 For simplicity, the ideology of 
the ruling government is either right-wing or left-wing (we return to what this means 
below) and we assume that elections induce (random) alternations between the two 
parties. At any given point in time, the “ideological state” of the society is Λt 
     (5)     Λ𝑡𝑡 = �Λ𝐿𝐿 with Prob  =  pΛ𝑅𝑅 with Prib= 1-p, 
where p is the probability that a left-wing party is in power at time t and 1-p is the 
probability that a right-wing party is in power. Society’s institutions are defined formally 
as a function, α, that, given the state of the economy at each time t, {𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡} and the 
ideology of the ruling government selects a development path (𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡) from the set of feasible 
paths. We can then write intertemporal social welfare explicitly as a function of 
institutions, the ideology of the current government, and the stocks of capital: 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =
𝑉𝑉(𝛼𝛼,Λ𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡). As time unfolds, and power alternates between parties with different 
ideologies, the society jumps from one development path to another. 
Given the framework above, we ask two key questions. The first question is how, 
in practice, we can judge whether the development path chosen by a society (𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡) is 
sustainable or not. The second question is how different ideological positions of the 
                                                          
5 Persistence is a strong assumption as institutions do change. It can be justified by the so-called “critical 
junctions” theory of institutional development. According to that theory, institutional reform happens at 
critical junctions in history. Once the new institutions are in place, they persist for a long time - until the 
next critical junction. (See Acemoglu et al. 2001 for an example of this line of reasoning.) That view is, 
however, challenged by modernization theory, according to which democratic institutions emerge gradually 
as a consequence of economic development (see, e.g., Gundlach and Paldam 2009 and Guerriero 2016, who 
shows legal institutions also evolve gradually in response to socio-economic factors). In the statistical 
analysis, we do attempt to capture institutional changes, but for the logic of the theoretical analysis to go 
through, it is a convenient simplification to consider institutions as fixed and ideology as the aspect that 
fluctuates.  
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government affect that choice. Starting with the first question, we know that, by definition, 
sustainability requires that intertemporal social welfare not be declining over time. Since 
intertemporal social welfare is not something that can readily be observed, this is, in itself, 
not very helpful for evaluating development paths empirically. Fortunately, Dasgupta and 
Mäler (2000) prove two important equivalence results that provide the fuzzy concept of 
sustainability with real empirical content.6 We shall focus on the most immediate of those 
results as it suffices for our present purpose. The social scarcity of the two capital assets 
can be measured by their accounting or shadow prices: 
     (6)     𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼,Λ𝑡𝑡) ≡ 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉(𝛼𝛼,Λ𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 , 
     (7)     𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡�𝛼𝛼,Λ𝑡𝑡� ≡ 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉(𝛼𝛼,Λ𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 . 
The shadow prices measure the change is intertemporal social welfare associated with a 
small increase in the relevant capital stock. Recall that intertemporal social welfare is a 
function of institutions, the ideological position of the ruling government and the capital 
stocks, i.e., 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉(𝛼𝛼,Λ𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡). Calculation of the total derivative gives: 
     (8)     𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉
𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
+ 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
. 
Using the definitions of the accounting prices from above (equations (6) and (7)), along 
with equations (2) and (3), we can rewrite equation (8) as: 
     (9)     𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼)𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼)𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 ≡ 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼, 
where GI is short-hand for genuine investment. Genuine investment reflects the change in 
society’s genuine wealth (GW), i.e., 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 ≡
𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
. Genuine investment is linked to the 
                                                          
6 See also Dasgupta (2001, chapter 9) and Hamilton and Clemens (1999). 
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change in intertemporal social welfare through equation (9), which provides the 
fundamental link between theory and empirical implementation. Equation (9) says that the 
change in intertemporal social welfare at time t in a society governed by institutions α 
with a government of ideology Λ𝑡𝑡 is increasing if, and only if, the net investment in its 
genuine wealth at that time is positive, i.e., if, and only if, genuine investment is positive. 
In other words, the main determinant of intertemporal social welfare is an economy’s 
productive base. That base consists of all of the economy’s capital assets, including 
manufactured and natural capital, as highlighted above, but, in general, the model also 
includes human and social capital. The change in the productive base can be expressed as 
the sum of the values of investment or disinvestment in the underlying capital assets, 
where the assets are priced at their social opportunity costs, i.e., at shadow prices. From an 
empirical point of view, some hope exists that genuine investment (GI) can be estimated, 
while intertemporal social welfare itself is much harder, if not impossible, to measure 
objectively. We return to the matter of how genuine investment can be measured 
empirically in section 3, but first we need to address the second question, i.e., how does 
ideology affect sustainability, as defined by the index of genuine investment, or put 
differently, why would partisan politics and elections induce cycles in genuine 
investment?  
 
2.2. Sustainable development and government ideology 
In democratic societies, the ideological position of the ruling government is likely to 
influence the scale, timing and composition of investments in the society’s capital stocks. 
Elections provide citizens with a mechanism for selecting new governments and, as a 
consequence, parties with different ideologies gain and lose control of government at 
election times. Our general hypothesis is that governmental change induces partisan cycles 
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in genuine savings and that a society over time may move on and off a sustainable 
development path. The classical works by Hibbs (1977, 1987) and Alesina (1987) have 
shown how partisan cycles can emerge in macroeconomic aggregates because left-wing 
governments are more inclined than right-wing ones to pursue expansive policies designed 
to yield lower unemployment and faster growth, but also running the risk of extra 
inflation. A more recent literature establishes how party ideology influences the size and 
scope of government, with left-wing governments being more expansionary than right-
wing governments (Pickering and Rockey 2011, 2013), while right-wing governments are 
more willing to deregulate labor markets (Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2012, 2013) and to 
promote deregulation of the energy, transport and communications industries (Potrafke 
2010).7  
We conjecture that the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties and their greater 
willingness to deregulate the economy will positively influence investment into 
manufactured capital and concentrate public spending on provision of merit goods like 
education at the expense of welfare programs. The later effect is reinforced by the 
observation that right-wing parties are more willing to mobilize private funds to co-
finance higher education (Kauder and Potrafke 2013). With respect to natural capital, 
which is preserved or accumulated through farsighted exploration of natural resources and 
through environmental regulations, it is less clear if right-wing parties will support 
policies that preserve and build-up the stock of natural resource capital to larger or smaller 
extents than left-wing parties. Right-wing parties’ general willingness to deregulate 
markets may, for example, spill over into a specific unwillingness to regulate externalities. 
                                                          
7 See also Reed (2006), Imbeau et al. (2001) and Frederiksson et al. (2013). Moreover, Folke (2014) shows 
that small political parties with a focus on specific issues such as the environment or immigration can 
influence policy on those margins. For a good survey of the relevance of government ideology, see Potrafke 
(2017). 
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It is, therefore, not a priori clear what the nature of the partisan cycle might be; the matter 
must be considered an open empirical question. 
Besides setting the stage for partisan cycles, the election calendar may also induce 
opportunistic cycles. According to the literature on opportunistic political business cycles, 
in their quest for votes, parties from across the ideological spectrum use the fiscal and 
monetary tools available to them to expand economic activity before elections and to calm 
the economy subsequently to reduce inflationary pressures.8 A by-product of such 
behavior could be a political business cycle in genuine investment. For example, the short-
termism in macroeconomic management induced by such opportunistic behavior may 
divert attention away from investment in the economy’s capital stocks and towards current 
consumption and in that way create a dip in genuine investment around elections. 
However, whether the unintended consequences of opportunistic attempts to manipulate 
the macroeconomy are sufficiently strong to create a political business cycle in genuine 
investment must also be considered an open empirical question. 
 3. Data and econometric specification 
 
To investigate the interplay between ideology, elections and genuine investment, we use 
an unbalanced panel dataset of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013. To be included in the 
sample, a country must have democratic elections over the relevant period.9 
                                                          
8 The theoretical foundation for the opportunistic political business cycle was laid by Nordhaus (1975) and 
integrated into rational expectations models by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) and applied in 
Aidt and Mooney (2014). The literature recently has been surveyed by Dubois (2016). Empirical studies 
suggest that favorable economic conditions in the lead-up to an election do benefit the incumbent 
government (Hibbs 2006). 
9 Specifically, we use the Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness from the Database 
of Political Institutions (DPI) to define the sample. It scores countries on a 1 to 7 scale with higher values 
meaning more competitive elections. We excluded countries with values lower than 6, meaning that we 
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In order to test for partisan cycles in genuine investment, we need two primary 
inputs. Firstly, we need empirical estimates of genuine investment across time and space. 
The World Bank, as part of its World Development Indicators (WDI) project, publishes 
those estimates (in percentage of gross national income, or GNI). The World Bank’s 
estimates of genuine investment are obtained by making four adjustments to gross national 
savings.10 The first adjustment is to deduct an estimate of consumption of fixed capital to 
account for depreciation of manufactured capital. The second adjustment is to add an 
estimate of investment in human capital. Public expenditure on education is used as a 
proxy for that. The third adjustment relates to the social cost of environmental pollution.11 
The fourth adjustment also is environmentally motivated. It seeks to account for energy 
depletion, mineral depletion and net forest depletion by subtracting an estimate of the 
relevant resource rents from net national savings.12 The result of these adjustments of 
gross national savings provides a rough estimate of genuine investment in terms of the 
percentage of gross national income (GNI). We follow Arrow et al. (2003) and convert 
those numbers into an estimate of growth in genuine wealth per capita (GWgrowth) by 
                                                                                                                                                                               
include countries (during periods) in which they had competitive elections and when multiple parties did win 
seats. A score of 6 indicates that the largest party received more than 75% of the seats, while a score of 7 
indicates that it won less than that (in some robustness checks, we restrict the sample to those countries with 
a score of 7). The countries in our sample are listed in the note to Table 2. It includes countries from Europe, 
the Americas, Africa, Oceania, the Middle East and Asia. 
10 For details on how it is computed, see Arrow el al. (2003). The WDI use the term “adjusted net savings” 
to describe what we refer as “genuine investment”. 
11 It has two parts. The first is designed to capture the cost of global warming. An estimate of the social cost 
of carbon dioxide emissions is subtracted from national savings, with the assumption that the average social 
cost of a ton of carbon is US$30. The second part is designed to capture the impact of local environmental 
degradation. The World Bank makes a financial deduction for an estimate of the health damages caused by 
urban air pollution (particulate emissions) from gross savings. 
12 The rents are calculated as the market price of the resource minus average extraction cost for the two non-
renewable resources (energy and mineral depletion). For renewable forest resources, the rent is estimated as 
the market price per unit of harvest in excess of the natural regeneration rate. 
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multiplying genuine investment as percentage of GNI by a presumed GNI-wealth ratio13 
and by subtracting the population growth rate from that product. Table 1 presents data on 
genuine investment from a selection of six countries and illustrates how they are 
calculated. We observe, in several cases, that countries with positive GDP per capita 
growth rates have at the same time experienced negative growth in genuine wealth per 
capita. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Secondly, we need empirical measures of government ideology. Constructing 
indicators of government ideology is complicated by the fact that substantial differences 
exist in party and parliamentary systems across the countries in our sample and by the fact 
that coalition governments consisting of two or more parties with different ideologies can 
be coded in different ways. We use the classification (EXECRLC) proposed in the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) to characterize party ideology.14 The DPI divides 
parties into three groups based on an evaluation of a party’s stance on economic policy. 
We define the corresponding indicator variables: Right, Left or Center. For single-party 
majority governments, the indictor variable corresponding to its ideology takes the value 
one in years during which the party rules a given country. For coalition governments, the 
DPI classifies a coalition government as having the ideology of the largest coalition 
partner. The group of right-wing parties includes conservative, Christian democratic and 
other right-wing parties; the group of left-wing parties includes communist, socialist, 
                                                          
13 In the baseline, we follow Arrow et al. (2004) and the ratios we use are 0.2 for industrialized countries and 
0.15 for developing and oil-rich countries. We have investigated if the results are sensitive to this choice and 
Table A2 in the supplementary material shows that the results are not sensitive to variations within the range 
of plus/minus 25.   
14 For the subset of OECD countries and for individual countries (such as the United States and Canada), 
more refined classifications of party ideology exist (see Bjørnskov 2005, 2008; Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
2012, 2013; Lamérisa et al. 2018). 
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social democratic and other left-wing parties; and the group of Center parties includes 
parties with positions that can best be described as centrist.15 
To estimate the impact of government ideology on genuine investment, we 
consider the following dynamic panel specification:  
(10)  GWgrowthit = ρGWgrowthit-1 + αIdeologyit + βPolit + γEconit + γt + vi + eit 
 
 
where i = 1,…,79 and t = 1981,…,2013. The coefficient on the first lag of the dependent 
variable (ρ) measures persistence in the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita 
(GWgrowth). The error structure includes a country-specific fixed effect νi, a time fixed 
effect γt and the idiosyncratic error term eit. The vector Ideology includes the indicator 
variables for the ideology of the government. The vectors Pol and Econ include, 
respectively, political and economic control variables. Table 2 describes the variables in 
detail. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
We include two main political control variables in all specifications. The variable 
Election year controls for the timing of elections and enables us to distinguish partisan 
cycles from election cycles. The variable Party tenure records the number of years that the 
government party has been in power. In some specifications, we replace that with the 
variable Leader tenure, which records the number of years that the current party leader has 
been in control. Those two covariates enable us to separate the effect of the incumbent 
                                                          
15 For further information on how the party classification is constructed, see the DPI codebook (Keefer 
2012). 
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party’s ideology from the effect produced by time in office. In some specifications, we 
also include the Polity IV index, which captures the quality of political institutions, 
allowing us to isolate the short- to medium-term effect of government ideology on 
sustainability from the potential long-run effect of changes in underlying political 
institutions. 
The theory underlying our use of genuine investment as an index of sustainability 
requires us to control for capital stocks and for the shadow prices associated with those 
stocks. Direct measures of the capital stocks are hard to come by; hence, we use the 
following imperfect proxies: Government consumption, Years of schooling, GDP per 
capita and Urban population ratio. It likewise is a challenge to find proxies for the 
relevant shadow prices. We note, however, that world market prices can in many cases be 
used as shadow prices for internationally traded goods. That observation suggests that we 
can use imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP (Trade openness) to proxy shadow 
prices. 
Owing to the country-specific fixed effects, νi,, the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error terms in equation (10) even if the latter are not serially correlated. 
Random or fixed effects estimates are biased and inconsistent in the presence of serial 
correlation (Baltagi 2008). Estimators that take into account that bias include: (i) bias-
corrected estimators; and (ii) instrumental variables estimators. Bias-corrected estimators, 
like the one proposed by Bruno (2005a, b) – the bias-corrected least squares dummy 
variable estimator (LSDVC) for dynamic panel data models – are suitable when the 
number of cross-sectional units (N) is small, which is not the case in our sample (N=82). 
For that reason, we estimate equation (10) with an instrumental variables estimator that is 
appropriate when, as in our case, the number of cross-sectional units dominate the number 
of time periods (Arellano and Bond 1991). Specifically, we adopt the one-step generalized 
17 
 
method of moments (GMM) estimator, which estimates equation (10) in first differences 
and uses the levels of the explanatory variables as instruments to avoid correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and the country-specific effects. We show that our 
estimates are robust to using either the two-step estimator or the system GMM estimator.16 
A problem that we have to deal with is the “too many instruments problem” that can lead 
to over-fitting biases, i.e., even if individually valid, the instruments can be collectively 
invalid because they over-fit the endogenous variables (Doornik et al. 2002; Roodman 
2009a, b). To minimize the over-fitting problem, we use the collapse alternative suggested 
by Roodman (2009b). The empirical results from our panel data analysis are presented and 
discussed in the next section. The online supplementary material reports on many 
robustness checks. 
 4. Main results 
 
                                                          
16Although the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator and relaxes 
the assumption of homoscedasticity, the efficiency gains are not that important even in the case of 
heteroscedastic errors. That result is supported by Judson and Owen (1999). They show empirically that the 
one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator, especially when the number of time periods is 
relatively large (T=30), which is the case in this study. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond 
(1998) suggest another GMM estimator with additional moment conditions. If the conditions are valid, 
efficiency will increase. The system GMM estimator combines the moment conditions of the model in first 
differences with those of the model in levels. However, if the orthogonality conditions for the first-
differenced equation are valid, but those for the level equation are not, then the system GMM estimator may 
not be better than first-differences GMM estimator. That can happen, for example, if the regressors used in 
the orthogonality conditions for the levels equation are correlated with the individual effects. Moreover, 
simulations suggest that the system GMM estimator is not necessarily superior to the standard GMM 
estimator in cases for which the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the time-series observations are 
relatively large (Blundell and Bond 1998; Moshirian and Wu 2012). That is what we observe in our data. So, 
to sum up, the estimator that is most suitable for our empirical analysis is the one-step first-differences 
GMM estimator. 
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Table 3 reports the main results from the one-step difference-GMM estimator.17 The 
instruments are valid according to the Hansen J-test and, as required, no second-order 
autocorrelation is found. The specification reported in column (1) includes separate 
indicator variables for left- and right-wing parties. The effect of government ideology is, 
therefore, measured relative to centrist governments. We see that growth in genuine 
wealth is systematically higher under right-wing governments and that no difference exists 
between left-wing and centrist governments, suggesting that we can be parsimonious and 
merge left-wing and centrist governments into one reference group; that is done in all 
subsequent specifications. From the specification reported in column (2), we observe that 
growth in genuine wealth is higher under right-wing governments than under either left-
wing or centrist governments. In column (3), we report, for comparison, a specification 
estimated with a fixed effects estimator rather than with the difference-GMM estimator. 
We observe that the point estimate on Right is smaller than the GMM estimate reported in 
column (2), but statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimate of the persistence 
parameter is much larger, as one would expect in the presence of Nickell’s bias. 
The positive effect of right-wing parties on GWgrowth is not just statistically 
significant, it also is of economic importance. The average growth rate of genuine wealth 
per capita is 0.62 with a standard deviation of 1.8 (see Table 2). Accordingly, based on the 
estimate from Table 3, column (2), a switch from a left-wing or centrist to a right-wing 
government increases the growth rate of genuine wealth in the average country by 0.147 
percentage points or by one-twelfth of a standard deviation. The long-run effect is an 
increase of 0.29 (= 0.147/(1-0.498)) percentage points. We interpret this as evidence that 
the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties, their greater willingness to deregulate 
                                                          
17 Table A6 in the supplementary material reports the results from a system-GMM estimator. The results are 
similar to those shown in Table 3. 
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markets,18 and their focus on provision of merit goods pay off in terms of investments in 
the fundamental capital stocks and, moreover, that that difference is sufficient to 
compensate for any under-investment in natural capital. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
In contrast to the robust evidence on the partisan cycle, the timing of elections by 
itself does not appear to affect the growth rate of genuine wealth. The point estimate on 
Election year never is statistically different from zero, rejecting the idea of an 
opportunistic election cycle in genuine investment.19 That finding is not entirely 
surprising. After all, it takes time to enact policies with substantive effects on genuine 
investment and, on top of that, it is hard for voters to observe and attribute short-term 
fluctuations in such investments to government policy. An implication, then, is that it is 
not elections per se that create cycles in genuine investment. Rather the cycles are created 
by underlying ideological differences with regard to economic policy that filter through to 
investments in genuine wealth.  
The partisan cycles in genuine investment are short- to medium-run phenomena 
that can cause a country to move on or off a sustainable path. In contrast, the nature of the 
                                                          
18 That conjecture is substantiated by the fact that the correlation between the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom Index and the right-wing government indicator is positive (0.11) and significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the correlation between the right-wing government indicator and the regulation sub-component of 
the Freedom House index (capturing credit, labor and business regulations) is negative (-0.14) and also 
significant at the 1% level. 
19 In additional experiments, reported in Table A1 in the supplementary material , we investigate the 
existence of cycles in elections that result in a change in the political orientation of the government, if 
differences are observed in pre- and post-election years, or if it matters how long the interval between 
elections is. Apart from a weak positive effect of elections that result in a change in government ideology, 
we find no evidence of an election cycle. 
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underlying political institutions can have a longer-term effect on the investments that a 
society makes in its fundamental capital stocks. More importantly, it is likely that the 
nature of the partisan cycle is, at least in part, a function of the underlying institutions. If 
so, we run the risk of conflating the two. To investigate that issue, Table 3, column (4) 
reports a specification that controls for the Polity IV index. This index is a comprehensive 
summary measure of the quality of a country’s political institutions at a given point in 
time. We observe that the point estimate on Right is a little smaller than before (0.126), 
but remains significant. In contrast, the point estimate on Polity IV Index is far from 
statistically significant. Similar results are obtained for other broad measures of 
institutions.20 It, therefore, appears that the partisan cycle in genuine investment is 
separate from any effect that might come from variations in the broader institutional 
environment.21 
Yet, the many important differences in party systems that clearly exist make it, as 
previously noted, a challenge to measure differences in government ideology consistently 
across time and space. One way to engage that challenge is to investigate potential 
heterogeneity across subsamples of countries with broadly similar party systems. In Table 
                                                          
20 Specifically, we consider the democratization index proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2018) and the machine 
learning-based index proposed by Gründler and Krieger (2016) as alternatives to the Polity IV index and find 
similar results [available upon request]. We also have investigated the effect of controlling for specific (as 
opposed to general) features of the political system including controls for the type of political regime 
(presidential versus parliamentarian; plurality versus non-plurality), for the election system (majority versus 
proportional rules) and for various indicators of the quality of institutions from the International Country 
Risk Guide. Those results are reported in Tables A3 and A4 in the supplementary material. Very 
occasionally one of the institutional controls is significant, but in no case does it have more than a small 
effect on the size and significance of the estimated effect of right-wing government ideology.  
21We have investigated if the effect of right-wing government ideology on sustainable development is 
conditional on the general quality of political institutions, on the regime type or on the election rule. We 
cannot find any evidence that it is contigent on the general quality of political institutions (results available 
upon request). Tables A3 and A4 in the supplementary material report that the effect is larger in plurality 
regimes and in countries with proportional election rules.  
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3, columns (5) and (6), we report specifications that split the overall sample into an OECD 
and a non-OECD sample. We observe a strong partisan cycle in both samples, but the 
point estimate on Right is larger for the sample of non-OECD countries.22 The larger 
amplitude of the cycle outside the OECD democracies is likely explained by larger 
differences in the ideological stances of left- and right-wing governments with regard to 
economic policy in non-OECD democracies.23 The main specification in equation (10) 
controls for country and time fixed effects and thus estimates the effect of government 
ideology from within country and year variations. In Table 3, column (7), we ask if the 
results are robust to controlling for continent-specific time trends. Those trends pick up 
regional movement of populism, the effect of the 1980s’ debt crisis, and other time-
varying and continent-specific heterogeneity. We see that the point estimate on Right is 
hardly affected by that re-specification. 
We have, by splitting the sample, investigated if the relationship between 
government ideology and genuine investment was different during and after the cold war. 
Table A6, columns (1) and (2) in the supplementary material show that the answer is no: 
the positive impact of right-wing government ideology holds during and after the cold 
war. In addition, we have experimented with different time aggregations of the data. In the 
baseline specification, the data frequency is annual. We think this is the right frequency 
for a study of partisan and election cycles. However, in the macro development and 
growth literature, the data commonly are time averaged into five- or even ten-year periods. 
That is done to eliminate short-run fluctuations. To establish the robustness of our baseline 
                                                          
22 While in the group of OECD countries the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is, on average, 0.13 
percentage points higher when a right-wing party is in office, in the non-OECD countries it is 0.24 
percentage points higher, ceteris paribus. 
23 Besides dividing the sample between the OECD and non-OECD countries, we also investigated 
alternative sample splits. Those results, reported in Tables A3, A4 and A5 in the supplementary material, 
show that right-wing parties affect investment in genuine wealth in presidential, plurality and proportional 
representation regimes and are observed in both high- and low-income countries/democracies. 
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results to the choice of the temporal unit, Table A6, columns (10) and (11) in the 
supplementary material report two specifications with five-year averages. As such, we 
recode Right as the fraction of each five-year period that a country was governed by a 
right-wing party and we replace Election Year with the variable Gov. changes, which 
records the number of changes of government within each five-year period. We note that 
the fraction of years under right-wing rule is positively correlated with growth in genuine 
wealth, while the effect of frequent government changes is negatively related, but not 
significant.  
Regarding the economic control variables, we observe from Table 3 that 
government consumption (Gov. consumption) have a negative impact on the growth rate 
of genuine wealth; GDP per capita is positively corrected with the growth rate of genuine 
wealth while Years of schooling is consistently insignificant; Trade openness and Urban 
pop. ratio are positive and significant only in the OECD subsample. 24 
In summary, we have uncovered a partisan cycle in the growth rate of genuine 
wealth: right-wing parties are associated with faster growth in genuine wealth than left-
wing parties. The result is robust, economically important and new to the literature. 
Conceptually, we argue that it is important for the macro development literature to shift 
attention from a narrow focus on growth in GDP and to embrace a broader conception of 
sustainable development that reflects political effects of on social welfare. That is not just 
a matter of principle; it is also a matter of drawing the correct empirical inferences. The 
importance of the latter is illustrated by the fact that if we replace growth in genuine 
wealth with growth in GDP per capita in equation (10) and re-estimate, we find the 
opposite result, namely that right-wing governments are associated with slower economic 
                                                          
24 Furthermore, the positive relationship between right-wing governments and genuine investment is robust 
to changes in the proxies for the economy’s capital stocks, shadow prices (see Table A2 in the 
supplementary material), exclusion of some countries (with more populist reputations), and to the use of the 
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (see Tables A6 in the supplementary material). 
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(GDP) growth than left-wing parties (see Table A6, column (9) in the supplementary 
material). 
 5. Endogeneity concerns 
 
Government ideology is not randomly assigned to the governing party. One may, 
therefore, be concerned that ideology could be correlated with unobserved time- and 
country-specific determinants of genuine investment. Reverse causality is unlikely to be a 
major concern, so the question is if the ideology of the elected government and genuine 
investment are jointly determined by unobserved, country-specific and time-varying 
shocks. For example, if an economic upturn (not captured by time fixed effects, by GDP 
movements, or by continent-specific trends) simultaneously increases investment in 
genuine wealth (say, by inducing more spending on schools) and makes the electorate 
favor a right-wing government, then the positive association between right-wing ideology 
and genuine investment could be spurious. In the estimations, we control for many 
observable determinants of genuine investment and for time and country fixed effects and 
in some specifications for continent-specific time trends; yet it is clear that we observe 
only a subset of the potential explanatory factors. It is encouraging that the coefficient on 
the ideology variable is stable across many different specifications, but that, by itself, does 
not rule out omitted variables bias. 
Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2017), however, show that the observable control 
variables can be informative about the size of the potential bias in the estimate of the 
coefficient of interest (here, the effect of ideology on genuine investment). That 
conclusion requires that selection on the observable factors included in the model is 
proportional to selection on the unobserved factors that are not in the model. Under the 
assumption of proportional selection, the relationship between ideology and the vector of 
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control variables contains information about the relationship between ideology and the 
vector of omitted or unobserved factors. That information can be used to evaluate the size 
of the bias. In practice, one does that by comparing the estimate of α and the R2 from the 
panel equation (10) above with those obtained from a “short” regression without any of 
the control variables or fixed effects. We can then calculate the value of proportionality of 
selection that would result in the estimated effect of ideology on genuine investment being 
attributable entirely to bias. We find the value to be 20.18 and observe that the difference 
in the R2 values is small (0.90 with controls and 0.81 without).25 The unobserved, omitted 
factors – the source of the potential bias – would then have to be 20 times more important 
in explaining the variation in ideology than the observed factors included as control 
variables. Since we selected the controls based on theoretical considerations, it would not 
be unreasonable to assume that they are at least as important as the factors we could not 
observe and measure. Seen in this light, it appears unlikely that the positive effect of right-
wing ideology on genuine investment is entirely or even mostly explained by omitted 
variables bias. 
 6. Ideology and tenure in office 
 
It takes time for a government to change the package of economic policies and for these 
policies to filter through to investments in genuine wealth. A long period in power 
generally is necessary for a government to fully implement its medium-term policies. The 
more time a government spends in office, the more scope it has for ensuring consistency 
across different dimensions of its economic and social policies. Frequent changes in 
government, on the other hand, tend to see such efforts interrupted or reversed. It is, 
                                                          
25 We use the Stata procedure PSACALC (Oster, 2017) to calculate the numbers. 
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therefore, reasonable, on the one hand, to expect that the number of years that a 
government rules could have an independent effect on genuine investment and, on the 
other, that it may interact with the partisan cycle we identified above. 
In all of the specifications reported in Table 3, we entered the variable Party tenure 
to ask if time in office has an independent effect on GWgrowth. The answer there clearly 
was no. The point estimate on the variable is insignificant, with the one exception of a 
marginally significant and positive effect in the OECD sample (column (5)). It is, of 
course, possible that the impact of time in office is non-linear, reflecting the natural life 
cycles of governments. On the one hand, as already noted, more years in office enables a 
party to implement its policy agenda. On the other hand, the literature on vote and 
popularity functions documents that a government’s popularity erodes the longer it is in 
office.26 As this “cost of ruling” reduces a government’s general popularity, it may switch 
to more populist policies. We may, therefore, observe a switch from medium-term policies 
that have a positive effect on genuine investment to short-term policies that have a 
negative effect as a government “ages” in office. Those considerations suggest that the 
relationship between time in office and investment in genuine wealth follows an inverted 
U-shaped relationship. Table 4, column (1) reports a specification with Party tenure and 
its square. We see that both coefficients are insignificant and that the point estimate on the 
indicator variable Right is unaffected by that change. In columns (3) and (4), we 
investigate the effect of the years that the party leader (rather than the party itself) has 
been in power. Again, we find no direct effect. Taken together, those findings reject the 
hypothesis that time in office exerts an independent (linear or non-linear) effect on 
genuine investment. It, however, does not rule out that time in office could interact with 
the partisan cycle in genuine investment. To test that hypothesis, we interact the indicator 
                                                          
26 See, for example, the seminal papers by Mueller (1970) and Veiga and Veiga (2004). 
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variable for right-wing parties, Right, with Party tenure or with Leader tenure. Table 4, 
columns (2) and (5) report the results. We observe that the interaction terms are very far 
from being statistically significant and we conclude that the partisan cycle appears to be 
unaffected by length of tenure. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 7. Conclusions 
 
The question of sustainable development increasingly has become important for 
policymakers in developing and developed countries. Climate change, aging populations 
and other important social and economic challenges have highlighted the importance of 
studying the subject. Sustainability is naturally linked to issues of governance in general 
and to policy decisions made by the governments in particular. Such policy decisions 
depend on government ideology and electoral concerns. 
In this paper, we add to the substantial existing literature on the influence of 
government ideology and electoral politics on public policy by studying the effect of 
ideology on investment in an economy’s capital stocks (its genuine wealth). We find 
strong evidence that the government’s ideological color matters and that investment in 
genuine wealth rises when right-wing governments are in office. Economic conservatism 
attributed to right-wing parties and their greater willingness to deregulate the economy 
may be driving that effect. The results are robust. In contrast, our results clearly rule out 
the existence of opportunistic election cycles. The expansion/contraction cycle near 
elections (if it actually occurs) does not seem to affect genuine investment. 
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Table 1: Genuine investment in selected countries, average figures 1996-2007 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Gross 
saving 
Consump-
tion of 
fixed 
capital 
Educa-
tion 
expendi-
ture 
Damage 
from C02 
emission 
Particu-
late 
emission 
damage 
Energy 
deple-
tion 
Mineral 
deple-
tion 
Forest 
depletion 
Genuine 
investment 
Growth 
rate of 
per 
capita 
genuine 
wealth 
Growth 
rate of 
per 
capita 
GDP 
(1970-
2000) 
 % of 
GNI 
% of     
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of    
GNI 
% % 
India 28.43 9.33 3.93 1.41 0.68 3.10 0.50 0.78 16.56 0.88 2.79 
Brazil 15.48 11.37 4.30 0.31 0.28 2.19 1.24 0.00 4.39 -0.74 2.07 
Thailand 31.24 13.64 4.62 1.04 0.30 3.09 0.01 0.26 17.50 1.53 4.68 
Nigeria 27.85 8.85 0.85 0.66 0.78 45.57 0.00 0.06 -27.22 -6.78 0.79 
USA 15.00 11.84 4.79 0.34 0.25 0.85 0.04 0.00 6.46 0.49 1.76 
UK 15.13 10.58 5.33 0.20 0.05 1.66 0.00 0.00 7.97 1.39 1.98 
Notes: The table illustrates how genuine investment as a percentage of GNI is constructed by making adjustments to gross savings. To obtain the growth rate 
of genuine wealth, we follow Arrow et al. (2003) and multiply genuine investment as percentage of GNI by the GNI-to-wealth ratios (0.2 for the USA and the 
UK and 0.15 for the rest) and subtract the annual population growth rate over the period 1996-2007. Damage from CO2 emissions is based on a marginal cost 
of $30 per tonne.  
Sources: Adopted from Aidt (2011) and based on World Development Indicators (several years). 
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Table2. Description of the variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max 
GWgrowth  Growth in genuine wealth per capita; it is 
equal to adjusted net savings (excluding 
particulate emissions) multiplied by the 
GNI-wealth ratio (0.15 for developing and 
0.2 for industrialized countries) and 
subtracting the average population growth 
rate. 
1817 0.62 1.80 -7.77 4.66 
Left Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
when a left-wing party is in office; and 0, 
otherwise (center or right-wing party). 
2042 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Right Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
when a right-wing party is in office; and 0, 
otherwise (centre or left-wing party). 
2042 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Party tenure The number of years a party is in office. 2029 7.54 9.45 1 71 
Leader tenure The number of years a chief executive is in 
office. 
2037 4.10 3.66 1 31 
Election year Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in 
the year of legislative elections; and 0, 
otherwise. 
2042 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Gov. consumption General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP). 
1999 16.60 5.62 2.80 54.52 
Years of schooling Average years of schooling. 1864 8.14 2.87 0.70 13.10 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (thousands of USD). 2012 15.79 15.89 0.19 86.13 
Trade openness Trade (Imports plus Exports as % of GDP). 2027 71.88 39.95 9.10 352.90 
Urban pop. ratio Urban population over total population (%). 2042 63.81 21.48 7.83 97.73 
Polity IV index Autocracy-Democracy index; it describes 
how democratic a country is on a scale 
ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 
+10 (strongly democratic). 
1350 8.62 2.28 -8 10 
Sources: World Development Indicators (1970-2013), World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) for GWgrowth  and for 
the economic and demographic covariates. Database of Political Institutions (1970-2012), World Bank 
(http://www.worldbank.org) for the political variables. Polity IV index comes from the Polity IV project (2013) database. 
Notes: The countries used in the estimations are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Rep. Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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Table 3. Baseline results: The effects of the government ideology on sustainable 
development (GWgrowth) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
GWgrowtht-1 0.497*** 0.498*** 0.665*** 0.753*** 0.555*** 0.305** 0.471*** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.061) (0.123) (0.103) (0.120) (0.169) 
Left 0.113       
 (0.083)       
Right 0.234*** 0.147*** 0.092*** 0.126** 0.133*** 0.241*** 0.120*** 
 (0.070) (0.049) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.093) (0.044) 
Party tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.007* -0.009 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) 
Election year 0.032 0.032 0.014 0.011 0.050 0.027 0.031 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.060) (0.031) 
Gov.  -0.048** -0.048** -0.027*** -0.070*** -0.142*** -0.034** -0.051** 
consumption (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) 
Years of  -0.030 -0.034 -0.051 -0.023 0.117 -0.414 -0.057 
schooling (0.138) (0.138) (0.053) (0.142) (0.127) (0.287) (0.094) 
Ln(GDP per  1.869*** 1.853*** 0.692** 1.642*** 0.924 2.227** 2.117*** 
capita) (0.631) (0.633) (0.272) (0.623) (0.722) (0.946) (0.758) 
Trade openness -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.011 0.014** -0.016** -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Urban pop. ratio 0.037 0.036 0.011 0.025 0.057** 0.032 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.033) (0.028) (0.047) (0.031) 
Polity IV index    0.040    
    (0.067)    
        
        
# Observations 1533 1533 1637 1164 789 744 1533 
# Countries 78 78 79 56 31 47 78 
# Instruments 50 49  50 49 49 53 
Continent trends No No No No No No Yes 
Sample Full Full Full Full OECD Non-OECD Full 
Hansen J-test 0.329 0.311  0.967 1.000 1.000 0.189 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.264 0.267  0.332 0.237 0.150 0.346 
R2   0.526     
        
Notes: The dependent variable is GWgrowth. See Table 2 for definitions of the variables. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. Year fixed effects included in all estimations. The one-step difference-GMM estimator is 
employed, except in regression (3) where a FE estimator is used instead; the lag of the dependent variable 
is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective lagged values and the other explanatory 
variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; the instrument set is collapsed to avoid 
the problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order 
auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Separate estimations for OECD and non-
OECD countries are reported in columns (5) and (6), respectively. Three OECD countries are dropped in 
these estimations: Estonia (due to few observations and lack of variability), Iceland (very few observations 
for the dependent variable) and Switzerland (no variability in the ideology; always right-wing 
governments). In column (7), we add continent-specific time trends. 
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Table 4. Ideology and time in office 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
GWgrowtht-1  0.496*** 0.497*** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.490*** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.173) (0.175) (0.1773) 
Right 0.143*** 0.124* 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.149** 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.049) (0.049) (0.069) 
Party tenure 0.009 -0.003    
 (0.010) (0.010)    
(Party tenure)^2 -0.001     
 (0.000)     
Right*Party tenure  0.005    
  (0.012)    
Leader tenure   0.007 -0.005 0.053 
   (0.009) (0.019) (0.061) 
(Leader tenure)^2    0.001  
    (0.001)  
Right*Leader tenure     -0.033 
     (0.063) 
Election year 0.026 0.031 0.024 0.027 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) 
Gov. consumption -0.048** -0.048** -0.048** -0.048** -0.047** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Years of schooling -0.032 -0.031 -0.036 -0.036 -0.021 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.141) (0.140) (0.140) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 1.836*** 1.852*** 1.822*** 1.860*** 1.709*** 
 (0.629) (0.631) (0.633) (0.638) (0.635) 
Trade openness -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Urban pop. ratio 0.035 0.036 0.032 0.030 0.025 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) 
      
      
# Observations 1533 1533 1534 1534 1534 
# Countries 78 78 78 78 78 
# Instruments 50 50 49 50 49 
Hansen J-test 0.351 0.253 0.243 0.292 0.210 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.272 0.267 0.264 0.260 0.251 
      
Notes: The dependent variable is GWgrowth. See Table 2 for definitions of the variables. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. Year fixed effects included in all estimations. The one-step difference-GMM estimator is employed, 
where the lag of the dependent variable is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective 
lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; 
they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. 
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Table A1. Sensitivity Analysis I 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GWgrowtht-1 0.5022*** 0.5149*** 0.4510*** 0.5150*** 0.4989*** 0.4680*** 
 (0.1735) (0.1887) (0.1726) (0.1989) (0.1739) (0.1726) 
Right 0.1453*** 0.1407*** 0.1156** 0.1447*** 0.1479*** 0.1094** 
 (0.0488) (0.0507) (0.0491) (0.0510) (0.0491) (0.0479) 
Party tenure -0.0027 -0.0001 0.0067* 0.0016 0.0006 0.0062 
 (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0076) (0.0060) (0.0039) 
Election year  0.0155    0.0260 
  (0.0370)    (0.0321) 
Election Gov change 0.1026*      
 (0.0544)      
Before Election  -0.0254     
  (0.0346)     
After Election   0.0174    
   (0.0282)    
Election timing    0.0092   
    (0.0545)   
Election month     -0.0067  
     (0.0566)  
Majority      0.0561 
      (0.0527) 
Coalition      0.0807 
      (0.0841) 
Gov consumption -0.0494** -0.0483** -0.0421** -0.0462** -0.0480** -0.0429** 
 (0.0221) (0.0229) (0.0195) (0.0210) (0.0217) (0.0198) 
Years Schooling -0.0310 0.0200 -0.0267 -0.0377 -0.0309 -0.0204 
 (0.1394) (0.1359) (0.1379) (0.1452) (0.1393) (0.1347) 
LnGDP per capita 1.9141*** 1.9921*** 1.9669*** 1.9914*** 1.8610*** 1.7316*** 
 (0.6455) (0.7023) (0.6133) (0.6814) (0.6333) (0.6228) 
Trade openness -0.0074 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0093 -0.0074 -0.0060 
 (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Urban pop ratio 0.0370 0.0296 0.0213 0.0331 0.0354 0.0315 
 (0.0308) (0.0342) (0.0300) (0.0319) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
       
       
# Observations 1533 1469 1504 1442 1533 1520 
# Countries 78 78 78 78 78 78 
# Instruments 49 48 49 49 49 51 
Hansen J-test 0.1077 0.2891 0.2500 0.0818 0.3341 0.5029 
AR(1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.2707 0.2434 0.3580 0.2139 0.2650 0.2968 
       
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4 in the main text. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step 
difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Election Gov change is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when there are elections that result in the change of the political 
orientation of the government; 0 otherwise. Before Election is equal to one in the years before the elections; 0 
otherwise. After Election is equal to one in the years after the elections; 0 otherwise. Election timing measures the 
passage of the time between election (it is equal to one in the election years). Election month accounts for the 
month of the election and it is computed as in Franzese (2000, pp 61-83). Majority is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one when the government has majority in the parliament; 0 otherwise. Coalition is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one when the government is formed by a coalition of parties; 0 otherwise.  
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Table A2. Sensitivity Analysis II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
GWgrowtht-1 0.3860*** 0.3912*** 0.4921*** 0.5529*** 0.3850 
 (0.1446) (0.1461) (0.1716) (0.1390) (0.2443) 
Right 0.1323*** 0.1302*** 0.1446*** 0.1851*** 0.1044*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0460) (0.0481) (0.0634) (0.0355) 
Party tenure 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0002 
 (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0078) (0.0043) 
Election year 0.0223 0.0250 0.0308 0.0314 0.0313 
 (0.0307) (0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0413) (0.0240) 
Gov consumption -0.0414** -0.0425** -0.0467** -0.0614** -0.0352** 
 (0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0279) (0.0159) 
Years Schooling -0.0063 -0.0046 -0.0071 -0.0390 -0.0303 
 (0.1287) (0.1290) (0.1332) (0.1785) (0.0982) 
LnGDP per capita   2.1922*** 2.4916*** 1.1978*** 
   (0.7258) (0.8094) (0.4565) 
GDPpc growth 0.0406***     
 (0.0124)     
GDP growth  0.0299**    
  (0.0120)    
Trade openness -0.0089 -0.0087 -0.0071 -0.0103 -0.0048 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0090) (0.0049) 
Urban pop ratio 0.0367 0.0380  0.0390 0.0357 
 (0.0283) (0.0290)  (0.0370) (0.0261) 
%Pop0-14   0.0408   
   (0.0460)   
%Pop65above   -0.1546   
   (0.0950)   
      
      
# Observations 1537 1537 1533 1533 1533 
# Countries 79 79 78 78 78 
# Instruments 49 49 50 49 49 
Hansen J-test 0.1549 0.1723 0.3261 0.4044 0.1279 
AR(1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.3907 0.3700 0.2646 0.2901 0.2411 
      
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step 
difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. GDPpc growth is the real 
GDP per capita growth rate. GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate. %Pop0-14 accounts for the percentage of 
population between 0 and 14 years old. %Pop65above accounts for the percentage of population with 65 years or more. 
Columns (5) and (6) report results considering different GNI wealth ratios in the construction of the dependent variable: 
in regression 5 (6), GWgrowth was computed considering 0.25 (0.15) for industrialized countries and 0.20 (0.10) for 
developing and oil-rich countries. 
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Table A3. Presidential vs non-Presidential regimes and Plurality vs non-Plurality regimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
GWgrowtht-1 0.6085*** 0.3989*** 0.4970*** 0.4970*** 0.1746 0.7099*** 0.4569*** 0.4569*** 
 (0.1636) (0.1262) (0.1741) (0.1741) (0.2213) (0.0954) (0.1723) (0.1723) 
Right 0.0924 0.1717** 0.1996**  0.1242* 0.1216 0.1864**  
 (0.0814) (0.0676) (0.0944)  (0.0652) (0.0893) (0.0757)  
Right*Presid    0.1996**     
    (0.0944)     
Right*NPresid   -0.0861 0.1135*     
   (0.1225) (0.0646)     
Right*Plural        0.1864** 
        (0.0757) 
Right*NPural       -0.0952 0.0912 
       (0.1175) (0.0762) 
Party tenure 0.0044 -0.0055 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0062 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0045) (0.0126) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0109) (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Election year 0.0486 0.0223 0.0319 0.0319 0.0234 0.0993** 0.0312 0.0312 
 (0.0485) (0.0409) (0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0495) (0.0506) (0.0320) (0.0320) 
Gov consumption -0.0341* -0.1036*** -0.0481** -0.0481** -0.0541** -0.0595*** -0.0459** -0.0459** 
 (0.0183) (0.0162) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0244) (0.0230) (0.0216) (0.0216) 
Years Schooling -0.2022 0.2104 -0.0307 -0.0307 -0.2363 -0.0017 -0.0395 -0.0395 
 (0.2466) (0.1662) (0.1375) (0.1375) (0.2799) (0.2088) (0.1380) (0.1380) 
LnGDP per capita 1.1932 0.8780 1.8501*** 1.8501*** 2.0856** 1.9007** 1.9648*** 1.9648*** 
 (0.8839) (0.7370) (0.6308) (0.6308) (0.8811) (0.9671) (0.6498) (0.6498) 
Trade openness -0.0119 0.0048 -0.0075 -0.0075 -0.0071** -0.0074 -0.0069 -0.0069 
 (0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0036) (0.0129) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Urban pop ratio -0.0236 0.0951* 0.0364 0.0364 0.0395 0.0608** 0.0392 0.0392 
 (0.0413) (0.0506) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0588) (0.0253) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
         
         
# Observations 740 757 1533 1533 771 690 1525 1525 
# Countries 40 36 78 78 38 35 77 77 
# Instruments 49 49 50 49 49 49 50 50 
Hansen J-test 1.0000 1.0000 0.2888 0.4154 1.0000 1.0000 0.8764 0.8764 
AR(1) 0.0003 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.3851 0.1573 0.2648 0.2648 0.0762 0.1515 0.3512 0.3512 
         
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step 
difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Presid (NPresid) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with presidential (non-presidential) regimes; 0 otherwise. Plural 
(NPlural) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with plurality (non-plurality) regimes; 0 otherwise. 
A plurality vote (e.g., in North America) or a relative majority (e.g., in the United Kingdom) describe the circumstance 
when a candidate or proposition polls more votes than any other, but does not receive a majority. 
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Table A4. Proportional representation vs majority representation and the role of institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
GWgrowtht-1 0.5959*** 0.2596* 0.4579*** 0.4579*** 0.4963*** 0.5133*** 0.5280*** 
 (0.2310) (0.1502) (0.1716) (0.1716) (0.1515) (0.1451) (0.1441) 
Right 0.1675*** -0.1410 0.1710***  0.1469*** 0.1423** 0.1422** 
 (0.0505) (0.1300) (0.0558)  (0.0562) (0.0581) (0.0576) 
Right*PropR    0.1710***    
    (0.0558)    
Right*MajR   -0.1505 0.0205    
   (0.1222) (0.1030)    
Party tenure -0.0015 0.0066 -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0014 0.0020 
 (0.0057) (0.0166) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0064) 
Election year 0.0653** -0.0233 0.0320 0.0320 0.0388 0.0294 0.0317 
 (0.0315) (0.0906) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0364) (0.0351) (0.0362) 
Gov consumption -0.0689*** -0.0443*** -0.0459** -0.0459** -0.0788*** -0.0783*** -0.0810*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0169) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0248) 
Years Schooling 0.0628 -0.1893 -0.0414 -0.0414 0.0194 0.0198 0.0300 
 (0.1142) (0.4116) (0.1368) (0.1368) (0.1494) (0.1519) (0.1507) 
LnGDP per capita 2.2846*** 1.3845 1.9981*** 1.9981*** 2.2967*** 2.6216*** 2.4849*** 
 (0.7541) (1.5153) (0.6535) (0.6535) (0.6525) (0.7519) (0.7274) 
Trade openness -0.0076 -0.0072 -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0042 
 (0.0089) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0070) 
Urban pop ratio 0.0484 0.0443 0.0380 0.0380 0.0425 0.0354 0.0415 
 (0.0304) (0.1318) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0361) (0.0387) (0.0370) 
FinRiskRating     0.0020   
     (0.0087)   
PolRiskRating     -0.0067   
     (0.0086)   
BureaucracyQual      -0.0584  
      (0.1016)  
Corruption      -0.0179  
      (0.0456)  
DemocAccountab      0.1072* 0.1116** 
      (0.0586) (0.0566) 
EthnicTensions      -0.1501*** -0.1329** 
      (0.0550) (0.0553) 
ExternalConflict      0.0628  
      (0.0480)  
GovStability      0.0031  
      (0.0185)  
InternalConflict      -0.0699*** -0.0597** 
      (0.0241) (0.0238) 
InvestProfile      0.0109  
      (0.0211)  
LawOrder      -0.0129  
      (0.0415)  
ReligiousTensions      0.0767  
      (0.1116)  
SocEcoConditions      -0.0328  
      (0.0239)  
        
        
# Observations 1219 286 1525 1525 1394 1394 1394 
# Countries 60 16 77 77 76 76 76 
# Instruments 49 49 50 50 47 56 48 
Hansen J-test 0.9956 1.0000 0.3773 0.3647 0.1751 0.9349 0.1588 
AR(1) 0.0001 0.0217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
AR(2) 0.3848 0.3732 0.3505 0.3505 0.4881 0.5668 0.5330 
        
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step 
difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. PropR (MajR) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one in countries with proportional (majority) representation systems; 0 otherwise. 
Institutional variables data comes from the International Country Risk Guide (see https://www.prsgroup.com/about-
us/our-two-methodologies/icrg).  
42 
 
 
Table A5. OECD vs non-OECD countries and High-income vs Low-income countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OECD NOECD All All HIC NHIC All All 
         
GWgrowtht-1 0.5553*** 0.3054 0.4992*** 0.4992*** 0.2137 0.5254*** 0.5031*** 0.5031*** 
 (0.1033) (0.2098) (0.1748) (0.1748) (0.2992) (0.1330) (0.1733) (0.1733) 
Right 0.1326*** 0.2408*** 0.1069*  0.1553*** 0.2127** 0.1550**  
 (0.0491) (0.0932) (0.0546)  (0.0588) (0.0927) (0.0665)  
Right*OECD    0.1069*     
    (0.0546)     
Right*NOECD   0.1313 0.2382***     
   (0.0982) (0.0834)     
Party tenure 0.0073* -0.0092 0.0048  0.0093* -0.0101 0.0081**  
 (0.0040) (0.0104) (0.0039)  (0.0048) (0.0103) (0.0041)  
Party tenure *OECD    0.0048     
    (0.0039)     
Party tenure *NOECD   -0.0139 -0.0090     
   (0.0122) (0.0114)     
Right*HIC        0.1550** 
        (0.0665) 
Right*NHIC       0.0131 0.1681* 
       (0.1215) (0.0906) 
Party tenure * HIC        0.0081** 
        (0.0041) 
Party tenure *NHIC       -0.0210* -0.0129 
       (0.0117) (0.0113) 
Election year 0.0503 0.0265 0.0307 0.0307 0.0418 -0.0098 0.0313 0.0313 
 (0.0352) (0.0601) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0295) (0.0619) (0.0332) (0.0332) 
Gov consumption -0.1416*** -0.0335** -0.0478** -0.0478** -0.1022*** -0.0407** -0.0477** -0.0477** 
 (0.0224) (0.0158) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0347) (0.0170) (0.0215) (0.0215) 
Years Schooling 0.1166 -0.4144 -0.0308 -0.0308 0.1581 -0.1263 -0.0358 -0.0358 
 (0.1268) (0.2873) (0.1376) (0.1376) (0.1663) (0.3069) (0.1392) (0.1392) 
LnGDP per capita 0.9244 2.2268** 1.8512*** 1.8512*** 1.9955** 2.2239** 1.8511*** 1.8511*** 
 (0.7219) (0.9464) (0.6307) (0.6307) (0.7832) (1.0755) (0.6333) (0.6333) 
Trade openness 0.0139** -0.0161** -0.0074 -0.0074 0.0002 -0.0146* -0.0072 -0.0072 
 (0.0055) (0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Urban pop ratio 0.0569** 0.0320 0.0373 0.0373 0.0328 0.0188 0.0365 0.0365 
 (0.0278) (0.0466) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0407) (0.0507) (0.0301) (0.0301) 
         
         
# Observations 789 744 1533 1533 870 663 1533 1533 
# Countries 31 47 78 78 37 41 78 78 
# Instruments 49 49 51 51 49 49 51 51 
Hansen J-test 1.0000 1.0000 0.4214 0.4214 1.0000 1.0000 0.6091 0.6091 
AR(1) 0.0026 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.2367 0.1496 0.2706 0.2706 0.2693 0.4381 0.2738 0.2738 
         
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step 
difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. OECD (NOECD) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for OECD countries (non-OECD countries); 0 otherwise. HIC (NHIC) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for high-income countries (not high or low-income countries); 0 otherwise. 
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Table A6. Other robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Cold After ≥2000 Without % Seats % Seats Strongly System GDPpc 5-year 5-year 
 War(CW) CW  Lat.Am. <75% <60% Democratic GMM Regression Spans Spans 
            
GWgrowtht-1 0.723*** 0.350* 0.222 0.363* 0.471*** 0.450** 0.413** 0.669***  0.382*** 0.383*** 
 (0.145) (0.204) (0.167) (0.202) (0.178) (0.179) (0.200) (0.095)  (0.049) (0.049) 
Right 0.250* 0.114** 0.057 0.131** 0.160*** 0.144*** 0.123*** 0.051** -1.165** 0.114*** 0.151*** 
 (0.132) (0.056) (0.080) (0.058) (0.053) (0.046) (0.044) (0.026) (0.593) (0.041) (0.041) 
Party tenure -0.001 0.010 0.007* 0.003 0.007 0.007** 0.002 0.002 -0.041   
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.067)   
Election year -0.012 0.038 0.034 0.015 0.029 0.031 0.039 0.046 0.305*   
 (0.055) (0.032) (0.043) (0.038) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.184)   
Gov changes           -0.021 
           (0.062) 
Gov consumption -0.023 -0.085*** -0.089*** -0.062** -0.061*** -0.079*** -0.060** -0.027** -0.052 -0.073*** -0.073*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.035) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.012) (0.050) (0.015) (0.015) 
Years Schooling -0.010 -0.116 0.058 -0.030 -0.055 -0.139 0.082 0.047 1.974* -0.152** -0.151** 
 (0.441) (0.149) (0.211) (0.176) (0.142) (0.208) (0.106) (0.038) (1.189) (0.067) (0.067) 
LnGDP per capita 1.210 2.353*** 2.062** 2.093** 1.857*** 1.127** 1.677*** 0.168**  0.668** 0.655** 
 (0.857) (0.887) (0.977) (0.897) (0.659) (0.522) (0.628) (0.082)  (0.321) (0.324) 
Private Investment         0.305**   
         (1.45)   
Trade openness -0.026 0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.035) (0.004) (0.004) 
Urban pop ratio 0.119** 0.027 0.031 0.005 0.033 0.059* 0.037 -0.001 -0.464** 0.026* 0.027* 
 (0.059) (0.040) (0.045) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.005) (0.223) (0.015) (0.015) 
GDPpc growtht-1         0.245***   
         (0.071)   
            
            
# Observations 383 1150 743 1113 1429 1115 1356 1638 1622 382 382 
# Countries 47 77 74 60 78 70 69 79 79 80 80 
# Instruments 39 38 30 49 49 49 49 51 48 46 47 
Hansen J-test 0.685 0.117 0.288 0.999 0.242 0.665 0.950 0.276 0.516 0.356 0.349 
Diff-Hansen test        0.354  0.481 0.501 
AR(1) 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.773 0.148 0.536 0.174 0.250 0.300 0.491 0.349 0.207 0.317 0.311 
            
Notes: See Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Regressions controlling for year 
fixed-effects. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. In columns 1 and 2 are considered the Cold War and after Cold War (>1991) periods. 
“≥2000” in column 2 indicates that the time period starts in 200. Latin America countries are excluded from the sample in regression 4 to avoid spells of populism. In regression 5 are only consider 
countries with a Legislative and Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness equal to 7 (the largest party received less than 75% of the seats), while in regression 6 we adjust the measure to less than 60% 
of the seats. As an alternative way to control for electoral competitiveness and democracy, regression 7 only considers those highly democratic countries (Polity IV Index >= 8). In column 8 are reported the 
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results from a Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (the difference-in-Hansen test assesses the validity of the GMM instruments of the levels equation). Finally, the results for a GDP per capita growth 
(GDPpc growth) equation are reported in column (9), where LnGDP per capita is replaced by private investment as percentage of GDP. In columns (10) and (11) are reported the results from a system-
GMM estimator using 5-year time spans and considering only those variables for which it makes sense to run the regressions with these spans. Right in this case measures the proportion of time a right-
wing government is in office in each 5-year span. Election year is replaced by Gov changes to account for the frequency of elections. It measures the number of government changes in each 5-year period. 
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Table A7. Description of the additional variables used in the sensitivity analysis 
Variable Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max 
Election Gov change  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there are elections that 
result in the change of the political orientation of the government; 0, 
otherwise.. 
2042 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Gov changes Account for the frequency of elections; it measures the number of 
government changes in each 5-year period. 
1738 1.65 0.65 0 4 
Election timing Measures the passage of the time between elections (varies between 0 
and 1; it is equal to 1 in the election years). 
1941 0.64 0.28 0.09 1 
Election month Accounts for the month of the election and it is computed as in 
Franzese (2000, pp 61-83); varies between 0 and 1 and a higher value 
is assigned if elections are later in the year. 
2042 0.08 0.22 0 0.96 
Majority Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the government has 
majority in the parliament, i.e. more than 50% of the seats; 0, 
otherwise 
2028 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Coalition Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the government 
consists of  a coalition of parties; 0, otherwise. 
2038 0.54 0.50 0 1 
GDPpc growth Real GDP per capita growth rate. 2014 2.09 3.62 -
22.55 
30.34 
GDP growth Real GDP growth rate. 2014 3.25 3.66 -
22.93 
33.74 
Private Investment Private investment as percentage of GDP. 1722 14.73 5.34 1.15 41.05 
%Pop0-14 The percentage of population between 0 and 14 years old. 2042 27.23 9.89 13.23 47.61 
%Pop65above The percentage of population with 65 years or more. 2042 9.75 5.01 2.12 22.22 
Presid Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with 
presidential regimes; 0, if non-presidential regime. 
2041 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Plural Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with plurality 
regimes; 0, if non-plurality regime. 
2021 0.51 0.50 0 1 
PR Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with 
proportional representation systems; 0, if majority system. 
2020 0.79 0.41 0 1 
OECD Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for OECD countries; 0, 
otherwise. 
2042 0.52 0.50 0 1 
HIC Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for high income countries 
(income > $12735 per annum, according to the World Bank); 0, 
otherwise. 
2042 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Institutional variables 
FinRiskRating 
 
Financial risk rating 
 
1683 
 
36.96 
 
7.28 
 
7 
50 
PolRiskRating Political risk rating 1683 71.27 13.44 27 97 
BureaucracyQual Bureaucracy quality  1683 2.74 1.13 0 4 
Corruption Corruption 1683 3.58 1.39 0 6 
DemocAccountab Democracy accountability 1683 4.87 1.16 1 6 
EthnicTensions Ethnic tensions 1683 4.31 1.39 0 6 
ExternalConflict External conflicts 1683 10.37 1.78 2 12 
GovStability Government Stability 1683 7.74 1.93 1 12 
InternalConflict Internal conflicts 1683 9.51 2.32 0 12 
InvestProfile Investment profile 1683 8.15 2.42 2 12 
LawOrder Law and order 1683 4.14 1.52 0 6 
ReligiousTensions Religious tensions 1683 5.02 1.17 0 6 
SocEcoConditions Socioeconomic conditions 1683 6.34 2.20 1 11 
Sources: World Development Indicators (1970-2013), World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) for the economic and demographic covariates. 
Database of Political Institutions (1970-2012), World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org) for the political variables. Institutional variables come from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG – for details on how they are computed see https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-
methodologies/icrg). 
 
 
